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2004] Woodworth: Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth: Has the Sun Set on Saving the D
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE V HOGARTH HAS THE SUN SET
ON SAVING THE DOLPHINS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) is home to large
numbers of tuna and dolphins.' A unique relationship exists between these dolphins and tuna: large schools of tuna tend to swim
underneath groups of dolphins. 2 By using the "purse seine"
method, fishermen take advantage of this relationship to help catch
large numbers of tuna.3 The purse seine method uses helicopters
and speed boats to spot, chase and herd dolphins and the tuna
swimming underneath these dolphins into nets. 4 Unfortunately,
this process does not discriminate; along with tuna, many dolphins
are captured and killed during this process. 5 Experts estimate that
1. See Bruce Lieberman & David Hasemyer, Scientists Say Studies of Dolphin
Stress Blocked; Tuna Fishing'sLink to Death at Issue, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
Jan. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 6559435 (noting that about 100,000 to 300,000
metric tons of yellowfin tuna are caught yearly in ETP); see also Dick Russell, TunaDolphin Wars: Conservationists are fighting to save beleaguered dolphinfrom deadly tuna
nets, DEFENDERS MAGAZINE, Summer 2002, available at http://www.defenders.org/
defendersmag/issues/summer02/tunadolphin.html
(approximating that one
quarter of world's fish population are located in ETP); THE ALLIANCE OF MARINE
MAMMAL PARKS AND AQUARIUMS, Dolphin and the Tuna Fishing Industry, at http://
ammpa.org/articles/dolphtuna.html (last modified Sept. 23, 2002) (describing
ETP's location and geographic specifics). The ETP is "500 miles wide and extends
from the middle of California to the middle of South America." Id.
2. See Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global
Commons: What We Can Learnfrom the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENrvL. L.
REv. 1, 13 (1999) (recognizing that schools of tuna will also swim under floating
objects such as logs); see also Russell, supra note 1 (noting that large, mature yellowfin tuna often follow dolphins).
3. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, 330 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(explaining how dolphins are used to locate tuna). Dolphins have to break the
surface every few minutes to breathe. Id. This makes it easy for fishermen to locate groups of dolphins. Id.; see also Lieberman & Hasemyer, supra note 1 (noting
surfacing dolphins use in locating tuna schools).
4. See Parker, supranote 2, at 13 (explaining that purse seining involves encircling tuna with nets that are usually up to one mile long and 600 feet deep, "pursing" bottom of net with drawstring which traps fish and then hauling in net); see
also Russell, supra note 1 (clarifying that time period starting when net is lowered
to when dolphins are released is called "set"); ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK,
U.S. Implements New Dolphin-Safe Standards (Jan. 4, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/
2000/NATURE/01/04/tuna.enn/index.html (indicating that three million dolphins are encircled by nets each year).
5. See Parker, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that dolphins are caught in nets
because they are unwilling to leap over closing nets); see also SEABITS, NEW ENGLAND AQUARIUM MONTHLY EMAIL NEWSLETTER, The Truth About Dolphin-safe Tuna,
at http://www.neaq.org/community/seabits/newsletters/99sep.html (Sept. 1999)
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tuna nets have killed approximately six million dolphins since fishermen started using the purse seine method in 1959.6
To decrease the number of dolphins killed during purse seining, fishermen developed a procedure called "backdown." 7 During
a backdown procedure, the fishermen bring most of the net onto
the boat, and then draw the remaining part of the net into a long,
narrow channel.8 The fishermen next put the vessel into reverse,
moving the ship away from the net.9 This maneuver eases the tension in the net and causes it to drop below the top of the water,
thereby allowing the trapped dolphins to escape. 10 Theoretically,
the backdown procedure appears to be a good way to free the dolphins caught in the nets, but in reality the procedure is a complicated one requiring both skill and training." The success of a
backdown procedure is further complicated when attempted dur12
ing "high-risk" situations, such as those involving darkness.
This Note will analyze Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth,13 in which
the Federal Circuit held that the Secretary of Commerce's (Secre(pointing out that other methods such as pole and line fishing do not put dolphins
at risk).
6. See Lieberman & Hasemyer, supra note 1 (noting tuna fishing's effect on
dolphins). Although fishing boats are now reporting less than 3,000 dolphins
killed each year, the dolphin population is not recovering. Id.; see also Russell,
supra note 1 (acknowledging number of dolphins killed is at least seven million).
Although estimates of the number of dolphins killed have dropped from 350,000
annually in the 1960's to 133,000 in 1986, it is hard to estimate how many dolphins
are killed because these numbers are based on observed mortality. Id. Further,
although the average numbers of dolphins killed each year has decreased, use of
the purse seine method has increased because of its effectiveness. Elise Miller, The
Fox Guarding the Henhouse: ConflictingDuties Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1063, 1067 (1991).
7. See Parker, supra note .2,
at 15 (recognizing that dead dolphins serve no
purpose). Fishermen have no use for dead dolphins because they cannot be sold,
they have to be separated from the captured tuna, and they cannot lead fishermen
to other schools of tuna. Id.
8. See Parker, supra note 2, at 15 n.47 (pointing out that dolphins will assemble near surface at far end of channel, while tuna remain further underwater).
9. See id. (explaining backdown procedure).
10. See Stephanie Showalter, Federal Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Tuna Challenge,
at http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/23.2tuna.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004)
(describing backdown procedure); see also Parker, supra note 2, at 15 n.47 (stating
specifically how backdown procedure allows dolphins to escape from nets).
11. See Miller, supra note 6, at 1067 (noting that although backdown procedures have decreased dolphin mortality rates, many dolphins are still killed); see
also Parker, supra note 2, at 16 (indicating that training for and actual backdown
procedure takes time and money away from fishing).
12. See Parker, supra note 2, at 16 (acknowledging that avoidance of high-risk
situations is critical to successful backdown procedure, but necessarily results in
catching less tuna); see also Russell, supra note 1 (observing that low levels of light
at sunset cause problems which make backdown procedure less successful).
13. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, 330 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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tary) Interim-Final Rule allowing fishermen to perform backdown
procedures one-half hour after sunset was acceptable even though
Congress stated in 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(1)(B)(v) that backdown
14
procedures should be completed one-half hour before sunset.
Part II describes the history of dolphin regulation leading up to the
International Dolphin Conservation Program Act and the InterimFinal Rule, and also presents the factual background for the Federal Circuit's decision. 15 Part III of this Note discusses the precedent governing the Federal Circuit's statutory analysis. 16 Part IV
then examines the Federal Circuit's reasoning. 17 Part V of this
Note is a critical analysis of the Federal Circuit's decision. 18 Finally,
Part VI explains the negative impacts the Federal Circuit's decision
could have on the dolphin population.' 9
II.

FACTS

In 1972, Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA), which governed the handling of all marine mammal
populations so as to maintain their "optimum sustainable population," and required that steps be taken to replenish mammals
whose numbers fell below this standard. 20 Congress gave the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS) the authority to supervise
marine mammals, including the dolphins located in the ETP. 2 1 In
1992, the United States entered into a non-binding international
agreement (La Jolla Agreement) which established the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP). 2 2 The La Jolla
14. For an analysis of court's holding, see infra notes 137-72 and accompanying text.

15. For a discussion of dolphin regulations and Defenders' factual basis, see
infra notes 20-44 and accompanying text.
16. For a history of statutory construction, see infra notes 45-106 and accompanying text.
17. For a description of the Federal Circuit's holding in Defenders, see infra
notes 107-36 and accompanying text.
18. For a critique of the Federal Circuit's holding in Defenders, see infra notes

137-72 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the potential impacts of the Federal Circuit's decision,
see infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (2001) (stating MMPA's goals). The statute let

the Secretary issue permits allowing a fisherman to incidentally take marine mammals. Id. at § 1371 (a) (2).
21. See George A. Chmael II & Nancy E. Whitman, Caught in the Net of Environmental Law and Policy: Moral Outrage Versus Cool Analysis in the ETP Tuna-Dolphin
Controversy, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 163, 171 (Fall 1998) (noting that NMFS is part
of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Department of

Commerce).
22. See id. at 174 (noting reasons why La Jolla Agreement was created). The
MMPA Amendments and other statutes placed embargos against Latin American
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Agreement sought to reduce dolphin mortality in the ETP by: (1)
setting annual limits on the number of dolphins that could be
killed in tuna nets; and (2) finding new methods of catching tuna
23
that would not affect dolphins.
In 1995, the United States and eleven other countries signed
the Panama Declaration (Declaration), thereby making the LaJolla
Agreement binding. 24 The Declaration sought to provide greater
dolphin protection by: (1) reducing dolphin mortality limits in the
ETP to levels near zero; (2) establishing annual dolphin mortality
limits; (3) creating incentives for fishermen to reduce dolphin mor25
tality; and (4) creating measures to avoid capturing dolphins.
In 1997, Congress enacted the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (the Act) to implement some of the Declaration's provisions. 2 6 The Act required the Secretary of Commerce to
make initial findings, determining whether purse seining had negative impacts on dolphin mortality rates in the ETP.27 Moreover, the
Act provided that when the Secretary declared that a legally-binding instrument creating the IDCP had been adopted and enforced,
the Act would become effective without further approval from Congress. 28 The Act additionally required the Secretary to incorporate
specific regulatory provisions in this instrument, including a provision requiring backdown procedures to begin thirty minutes before
sundown. 29 Specifically, the Act stated that the regulations must
"ensur[e] . . . that the backdown procedure during sets of purse
countries causing problems to arise between the United States and certain Latin
American countries. Id. at 172-74 (giving history of conflict). These problems created the need for a new agreement. Id. at 174.
23. See id. (acknowledging that La Jolla Agreement's objectives also concerned maintaining tuna in optimal numbers).
24. See Chmael, supra note 21 at 176 (recognizing that La Jolla Agreement
had not improved international relations).
25. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1340 (Ct. Intl.
Trade 2001) (noting additional goals were to strengthen national scientific advisory committees and enhance compliance of nations to commitments).
26. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, 330 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citing Pub. L. No. 105-42, 111 Stat. 1122 (1997) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § § 1371 &
1411)) (noting that Act revised MMPA).
27. Defenders, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d) (2)) (noting that Act required Secretary to determine "whether the intentional deployment
on or encirclement of dolphin with purse seine nets is having a significant adverse
impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.").
28. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 105-42 at § 8, 111 Stat. at 1139) (recognizing that
provision allowing completion of legally binding instrument to govern effective
date of statute is "noteworthy feature of the legislation").
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (B) (2000). Other specified provisions required
observers on ships and requirements establishing dolphin mortality limits. Id.
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seine net on marine mammals is completed and rolling of the net
30
to sack up has begun no later than 30 minutes before sundown."
In May of 1998, pursuant to the Act, the Secretary created the
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program
(International Agreement). 3 1 Through the NMFS, the Secretary
published the initial findings of the Act one year later. 3 2 On June
14, 1999, the Secretary published a proposal to implement the
Act. 33 Finally, on January 3, 2000, the Secretary published an Interim-Final Rule implementing the provisions of the Act. 34 The

Interim-Final Rule stated that "on every set encircling dolphin, the
backdown procedure must be completed no later than one-half
hour after sundown .... 35

In Defenders, various non-governmental organizations and individuals (Defenders) brought suit in the United States Court of International Trade, arguing that decisions made by the NMFS' Assistant Administrator, William T. Hogarth (Hogarth), were erroneous. 36

Defenders argued that the Interim-Final Rule did not

conform to the Act and was, therefore, not in accordance with the
30. Id. at § 1413(a) (2) (B) (v) (emphasis added) (stating requirements of
regulation).
31. Defenders, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1341 (noting that International Agreement
became effective on February 15, 1999 after involved nations deposited ratifications of agreement).
32. Id. at 1341-42 (citing Taking of Marine Mammals Incident to Commercial Fishing Operations Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP); Initial Finding, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,590, 24,591 (May 7, 1999)) (noting that Secretary
determined that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that encirclement of
dolphins with purse seine nets was adversely affecting depleted dolphins stocks in
ETP).
33. See Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations;
Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), 64 Fed. Reg.
31,806 (June 14, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216) (accepting public comments); see also Defenders, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (noting that several Plaintiffs
submitted written comments and testified at public hearings).
34. See Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations;
Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), 65 Fed. Reg. 30
(Jan. 3, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216 & 15 C.F.R. pt. 902) [hereinafter
Taking of Marine Mammals] (setting out specifics of Interim-Final Rule).
35. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(c) (6) (iii) (2002) (emphasis added) (defining sunset
and requiring fishermen conducting sets extending beyond one-half hour after
sundown to use high intensity lighting system).
36. Defenders, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (acknowledging that Defenders requested remand to Secretary); see also Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1363-64 (noting that
Defenders brought case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) (3) which states that "the
Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action
commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of
any law of the United States providing for... (3) embargoes or other quantitative
restrictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety ...." (citing Turtle Island Restoration Network v.
Evans, 284 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2002))).
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law. 37 Specifically, Defenders claimed that the Secretary ignored

the Act's plain language requiring fishermen to complete backdown procedures one-half hour before sundown by allowing the Interim-Final Rule to require fishermen to complete backdown
procedures one-half hour after sundown.3 8
The Court of International Trade decided in favor of Hogarth
and held the Act's requirement that fishermen complete all
backdown procedures no later than one-half hour before sundown
was a drafting mistake not in accordance with congressional intent
expressed in previous legislation. 39 The court pointed to prior
dolphin protection legislation, the Act's legislative history, and the
International Agreement as proof that Congress mistakenly used
the word "before" instead of "after" in setting the permissible time
period for backdown procedures. 40 Defenders appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 41

Although the Federal Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of
the Court of International Trade, it ultimately affirmed the lower
court's decision and held that the Court of International Trade did
not err in concluding that the Interim-Final Rule was consistent
with the Act. 42 The Federal Circuit found that the Act clearly re-

quired that fishermen complete backdown procedures one-half
hour before sundown, regardless of legislative intent.4 3 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that the NMFS possessed the authority
to alter the Act's requirements for backdown procedures. 44

37. Defenders, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1344 (noting that Defenders also contended
that Interim-Final Rule violated amended MMPA).
38. Id. (setting out Plaintiffs' other arguments which will not be discussed in
Note).
39. Id. at 1345-46 (holding also that one-half hour after sunset rule makes
practical sense because of difficulty predicting when sun is going to set).
40. Id. (acknowledging that language of regulation conflicts with "express
statutory language").
41. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1364 (acknowledging that Federal Circuit has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (5)).
42. Id. at 1374 (summarizing court's holding). The Federal Circuit reviewed
the Court of International Trade's ruling de novo and without deference to that
court. Id. at 1364 (noting standard of review).
43. Id. at 1367. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit's reasoning, see infra
notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
44. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1367. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss2/6

6

v. Hogarth:SETS
Has the Sun Set on Saving the D
SUNDOWN
2004] Woodworth: Defenders of Wildlife
III.

BACKGROUND

Before analyzing the Federal Circuit's decision in Defenders, it is
necessary to examine statutory construction precedent. 45 Consequently, this section will provide a synopsis of cases involving judi46
cial interpretation of statutes, regulations, and agency action.
A. Judicial Interpretation of Statutes and Regulations
1.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
47
Inc.

The amended Clean Air Act of 1977 (CAA) required states that
had not achieved national air quality standards to create a permit
program regulating "new or modified major stationary sources" of
air pollution. 48 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) created a regulation to implement this permit requirement. 49 This
regulation allowed states to adopt a plant-wide definition of "stationary source. '50 According to this definition, a plant with pollutionemitting devices could install a new piece or modify an existing
piece of equipment without conforming to the permit requirements as long as the alteration would not increase total plant emissions. 51 The EPA's definition of "stationary source" allowed states
to consider all devices emitting pollution within the same industrial
52
group, as if they were in a "bubble."
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court considered whether the EPA's interpretation of "stationary source" was reasonable. 53 The Chevron
court created a two-prong test for reviewing an agency's construc45. For a historical analysis of statutory construction, see infra notes 45-106
and accompanying text.
46. For a review of cases concerning judicial interpretation of statutes and
regulations, see infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text. For a review of cases
concerning judicial interpretation of agency action, see infra notes 84-106.
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

48. Id. at 840 (noting that question in case rests on definition of "stationary
source" in 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6)).

49. Id. (identifying permit requirement).
50. Id. (defining stationary source).

51. Id. (noting that generally permit applicants needed to meet several stringent conditions before permits would be issued for new or modified stationary
source).
52. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (pointing out issue was whether EPA's decision
was rooted in reasonable construction of "stationary source").
53. Id. (noting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)(i) definition of "stationary source").
"Stationary source" means "any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." Id. at 840
n.2.
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tion of a statute.5 4 The first prong asks whether Congress specifically addressed the issue in question within the statute itself.55 If
Congress has spoken directly to the issue, "that is the end of the
matter," because courts and agencies must give effect to the expressed intent of Congress if that intent is unambiguous. 56 If it appears Congress has not spoken directly to the issue in question, the
court must decide whether the agency's interpretation is "based on
57
a permissible construction of the statute."
In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that Congress had not spoken directly to the issue in question because it had not explicitly
defined to what "stationary sources" the permit program might apply. 58 Having negatively answered the first question, the Court
turned to the second prong of the test. 59 Under the second prong,
the Chevron court held that the EPA's interpretation of "stationary
60
source" was permissible.
2.

Bohac v. Department of Agriculture61

In 1989, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Act
(WPA) to protect government employees who revealed potentially
damaging information about the government. 6 2 Under the 1994
Amendments to the WPA, Congress allowed the board hearing employee claims to give protected whistleblowers corrective action,
such as: "back pay and related benefits, medical costs incurred,
54. Id. at 84243 (setting out two prongs of test).
55. Id. at 842 (specifying that question is whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.").
56. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243 n.9 (noting additionally that court has final say
on issues of statutory construction and must reject constructions by agencies that
are inconsistent with clear congressional intent); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (holding that, in any case of statutory construction, court's analysis begins with language of statute, and where statutory language
is clear, "it ends there as well.").
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (acknowledging that to uphold agency's construction, court does not have to conclude that construction was only one agency could
have adopted).
58. Id. at 845 (noting that court based its decision on examination of legislation and legislative history).
59. Id. at 845-66 (analyzing whether EPA's use of bubble concept was reasonable).
60. Id. at 866 (giving reasoning for holding). The court also held that "an
initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved into stone." Id. at 863.
61. 239 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
62. See id. at 1337 (quoting Weber v. Dep't of the Army, 9 F.3d 97, 101 (Fed. Cir.
1993)) (noting that Congress wanted to strengthen existing protections of federal
whistleblowers).
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travel expenses, and any other reasonable and foreseeable conse63

quential changes."

In Bohac v. Department of Agriculture, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit analyzed the meaning of the phrase "any other
reasonable and foreseeable consequential changes" after a claimant, who was denied non-pecuniary damages, challenged the use of
the word "changes. ' 64 The Federal Circuit held that the use of the
word "changes" was an "obvious mistake." 65 Consequently, the Federal Circuit stated that it had authority to disregard the word
"changes" and supplant it with "damages.

3.

'66

67
Garcia v. United States

In Garcia v. United States, the United States Supreme Court examined the meaning of the phrase "any money, or other property
of the United States" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2114.68 Petitioners
were convicted of assaulting a Secret Service Agent, who was considered a "lawful custodian of Government money," with the intent
of stealing that money.6 9 Petitioners argued that their conviction
was unlawful because Congress intended the statute to protect only
"postal" money or property.7 0
The Garcia court held that the statute's language had a plain
and unambiguous meaning. 71 The Garciacourt continued its analysis by looking to the legislative history, but recognized that "only the
most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions... would justify
63. Id. at 1337-38 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(A)) (pointing out that
amendments also required that whistleblower be placed in same position as
before).
64. Id. at 1338 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1214(g)(1)(A)(ii)) (noting most agreed
word should have been "damages").
65. Id. (acknowledging that in addition to support provided by legislative his-

tory that word was supposed to be "damages," support was also provided by 5
U.S.C. § 121 4 (g), counterpart provision of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)).
66. Bohac, 239 F.3d at 1338-39 (noting courts can interpret statutes to correct
obvious mistakes).

67. 469 U.S. 70 (1984).
68. Id. at 73. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 prohibits assault with intent to rob "any person
having lawful charge, control or custody of any mail matter or of any money or other
property of the United States .... " Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2114).
69. Id. at 72 (noting that Petitioners were sentenced to maximum allowed
(twenty-five years) because assault with dangerous weapon put Secret Service
agent's life in danger).
70. Id. at 73 (recognizing that language of statute contradicts Petitioner's argument because language extends to custodians of any mail matter, United States
money, and other United States property).
71. Garcia,469 U.S. at 73-75 (noting facial analysis of statute does not suggest
congressional intent to limit protection of statute to postal workers).
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a limitation on the 'plain meaning' of the statutory language."7 2
The Garcia court further limited the role of legislative history in
interpreting unambiguous statutes by holding that, in these cases,
'Judicial inquiry is complete except in 'rare and exceptional circumstances."' 73 Ultimately, the Garcia court refused to disregard
the statute's plain meaning based on Petitioner's theory of congres7
sional intent. "
4.

75
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain

In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, the United States Supreme Court held that it would not consider the legislative history
of a statute. 7 6 Germain, a trustee of O'Sullivan's Fuel Oil Company
(Fuel), sued Connecticut National Bank (Bank), a creditor of Fuel,
in statd court during O'Sullivan's bankruptcy proceedings. 77 Bank
removed the case to the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut which, pursuant to a local rule, transferred the
case to Bankruptcy Court. 78 The Bankruptcy Court denied one of
Bank's motions, and the District Court affirmed this ruling.79 Bank
appealed the ruling, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.8 0 Bank argued that
28 U.S.C. § 1292 gave the court appellate jurisdiction. 8 1 Germain
argued that section 1292 did not apply to his case because Congress
72. Id. at 75-76 (indicating most authoritative source for determining legislative intent was in Committee Reports on bill).
73. Id. at 75 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978); Crooks v.
Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)) (implying that issue presents rare and exceptional circumstance).
74. Id. at 79 (saying answer to Petitioner's claims was that "Congress did not
write the statute that way." (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983))).
75. 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
76. Id. at 254 (holding that "judicial inquiry into the applicability of § 1292
begins and ends with what § 1292 does say .... ").
77. Id. at 250 (noting Germain was suing for various torts and breaches of
contract).
78. Id. (acknowledging that Bankruptcy Court was overseeing liquidation of
Fuel).
79. Id. (noting Germain demanded jury trial, which Bank moved to strike).
80. Conn. Nat. Bank, 503 U.S. at 250 (disallowing appeal). A court of appeals
can only exercise jurisdiction over a bankruptcy court's interlocutory orders when
a district court gave the order after withdrawing the case from bankruptcy court
and not when a district court acts as a court of appeals for a bankruptcy court. Id.
at 251.
81. Id. (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1292 states that courts of appeals have jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of district courts).
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intended 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) to override section 1292.82 The Su-

preme Court found for Bank, refusing to consider legislative history
83
because the language of both statutes was unambiguous.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Agency Action
1.

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) v. Chenery
84
Corporation

The issue in SEC v. Chenery Corporationstemmed from the SEC's
approval of an order based on the reorganization of a company
pursuant to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.85
Under this order, while reorganizations plans brought by management were being considered by the SEC, the preferred stock acquired by company officers and directors would not be converted
into stock of the reorganized company, like all other preferred
stock.8 6 Instead, directors and officers would have to surrender the
stock purchased at cost.8 7 The SEC upheld the order, basing its

decision upon precedent analyzing the fiduciary duties of a reorga88
nizing company's management.
In Chenery, the United States Supreme Court overturned the
SEC's decision because it was not in accordance with the principles
of fiduciary duties as determined by other courts.8 9 The SEC then
argued that the Court should still uphold the plan because, during
reorganization, management could take advantage of their positions.90 The Chenery court, however, determined that it could not
examine other grounds for the SEC's ruling because it must review
an administrative order solely on the grounds upon which the re82. Id. at 251-53 (noting that while 28 U.S.C. § 1292 confers jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) confers jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of district courts when they act as appeals courts for bankruptcy
courts).
83. Id. at 253-54 (presuming that "a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says.").
84. 318 U.S. 80 (1942)

85. Id. at 81 (noting that company brought proceeding to SEC to review order approving company's plan for reorganization).
86. Id. (pointing out that order applied to "successive" plans proposed).
87. Id. (noting that provision would allow other preferred stock holders to
participate in reorganization on higher level than preferred stock members affected by provision).
88. Id. at 87 (noting that SEC stated that management violates fiduciary duty
to stockholders if it purchases stock).

89. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 88 (recognizing that courts do not impose any fiduciary duty on management to refrain from buying stock simply because they are
managers).
90. Id. at 90 (identifying another reason court should uphold organizational

plan).
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cord showed the agency originally based its decision. 9 1 Therefore,
even though Congress had given the SEC the power to judge reorganization plans, an SEC determination would not be upheld on
different grounds simply because the SEC could have based its determination on those grounds. 9 2 Furthermore, the Chenery court
found that the review process mandated that the grounds upon
93
which an agency acts be clear and sustainable.
94
2. Fleshman v. West

In Fleshman v. West, Fleshman's damages claim for injuries obtained while on duty with the United States Army was denied by the
Department of Veteran Affairs (Department) because Fleshman
failed to completely fill out the report necessary to file a claim. 95
Five years later, Fleshman filed a new claim which became effective
when it was received by the Department. 9 6 Fleshman initiated a suit
to have the latter claim applied retroactively from the date he filed
his first application. 97 The Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) denied Fleshman's claim for an earlier effective date, holding that
Fleshman abandoned his original claim because his form was not
properly completed. 98 The Court of Veterans Appeals affirmed this
decision, but based its decision on a different ground. 99 The court
held that Fleshman's original claim did not comply with the form
prescribed by the Secretary of Veteran Affairs.10 0 Fleshman argued
that when reviewing a decision of the Board, the Court of Veterans
Appeals was restricted to examining only the grounds upon which
91. Id. at 92-94 (holding that "action must be measured by what the Commission did, not by what it might have done.").
92. Id. at 94 (noting that if Congress gave courts review of agency's determination, courts could overturn order when agency has misinterpreted law).
93. Id. (noting courts cannot review decisions unless they are aware of considerations supporting action).
94. 138 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
95. Id. at 1430 (noting Fleshman's claim was returned to him with instructions to complete form and Fleshman never complied with instructions).
96. Id. at 1431 (acknowledging that second form was properly filled out).
97. Id. (relying on 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1)). 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b) (1) says that
the effective date shall be the day following the date of discharge if the application
is filed within one year. Id. Fleshman used 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b) (1) to argue that
his earlier application allowed his effective date to be the day after his discharge
from service. Fleshman, 138 F.3d at 1431.
98. Id. (holding Fleshman was entitled to benefits when Department received
his completed claim form).
99. Id. (setting out Court of Veterans Appeals' reasoning).
100. Id. (relying on 38 U.S.C. § 5101 (a) which states that "specific claim in
the form prescribed by the Secretary [of Veteran Affairs] must be filed .... " (alteration in original)).
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the Board relied to make its decision and could not substitute its
own ground. 10 1
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Chenery doctrine must be flexible. 10 2 A court, therefore, does not have
to remand a case to an agency if it is obvious that the agency would
have "reached the same ultimate result" if it had considered the
alternative ground. 10 3 Specifically, the Federal Circuit stated that
the Board would have reached the same conclusion if it had considered whether or not Fleshman complied with the form's requirements because the Board's findings showed that it decided what
information was needed to comply with the form prescribed by the
1 04
Secretary.
According to the Federal Circuit, under the Chenery doctrine, a
court is not prohibited from affirming an agency's decision on a
different ground if that ground does not need "a determination of
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to
make." 10 5 In addition, the Federal Circuit distinguished Chenery
from Fleshman and explained that the Board in Fleshman took an
additional step when it decided what information was necessary for
10 6
compliance with the Secretary's requirements.

101. Id. (arguing that Board relied on abandonment ground, so Court of Veterans Appeals could not affirm on ground that Fleshman failed to comply with
statute).
102. Fleshman, 138 F.3d at 1433 (citations omitted) (acknowledging that other
courts recognize principle).
103. Id. (quoting Ward v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 981 F.2d 521, 528 (Fed. Cir.
1992)) (noting that agency would have reached same conclusion if it had considered ground relied upon by Court of Veteran Appeals); see also Chenery, 318 U.S. at
88 ("It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court concluded should
properly be based on another ground within the power of the appellate court to
formulate.").
104. Fleshman, 138 F.3d at 1433 (holding that Board's finding that Plaintiff
did not originally file completed claim form is sufficient to provide factual basis for
conclusion that Plaintiff did not file form which conformed to Secretary's requirements). The court also noted that the Board's underlying findings demonstrated
that the Board had already exercised its discretion. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 95 F.3d 1094, 1101 (Fed. Cir.
1996)) (discussing Chenery doctrine).
106. Id. (noting that Board's conclusion contained explicit findings that
Plaintiff's original form was incomplete); see also Chenery, 318 U.S. at 93-94 (holding that because Commission made no judgment regarding what is "detrimental to
the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers," court cannot independently make that determination).
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NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, Defenders argued that the Interim-Final Rule created by the NMFS did not conform to the International Dolphin Conservation Act.107 Specifically, Defenders
argued that the Interim-Final Rule was contrary to the Act's plain
language and, therefore, hindered Congress' intent to protect dolphins.1 08 Hogarth contended that use of the word "before" was an
"inadvertent drafting mistake" which the Federal Circuit needed to
correct. 10 9 Specifically, Hogarth argued that Congress intended to
use the word "after" instead of the word "before" because the
MMPA required fishermen to complete backdown procedures onehalf hour after sunset. 110 Furthermore, Hogarth argued that Congress intended the one-half hour after sunset international standard to govern the Interim-Final Rule because the Act authorized
the Secretary to create and implement the International Agreement without congressional approval. 1 '
A.

Chevron Analysis

To determine whether the Secretary lawfully interpreted the
Act, the Federal Circuit conducted a Chevron analysis.1 1 2 The court
examined the Act's language and concluded that because the statute clearly used the word "before," and did not define or place limits on that term, it would assume that the ordinary meaning of the
word "before" applied." 3 Furthermore, the court said that the Interim-Final Rule and the Act could not be reconciled because the
107. See Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1364-65 (noting that Defenders chose not to
appeal Court of International Trade's decision regarding embargo against
Mexico).
108. Id. at 1365. Defenders argued that Act required backdown to be completed one-half hour before sundown, but Interim-Final Rule required backdown

to be completed one-half hour after sundown. Id. at 1363.
109. Id. at 1365-66 (acknowledging that Court of International Trade held
that use of "before" was drafting error).

110. Id. (noting that MMPA Amendments as prior legislative enactment is evidence of congressional intent).
111. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1367 (arguing that "the statutory scheme of the

[Act], where Congress directed the [Secretary] to negotiate and implement an
International Agreement without returning to Congress for approval ....
suggest[s] that Congress intended the international standard to govern the implementing regulations.").
112. Id. at 1366. The first prong of the test asks whether Congress has spoken
directly to issue; if that question is answered in the negative, the second prong asks
whether agency's interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
113. Id. (explaining that statute's text is first place to look to determine intent
of Congress (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999))).
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Interim-Final Rule's use of the word "after" was also clear.1 14 Under
Chevron, the court held that the use of the word "before" in the Act
115
denoted a clear indication of congressional intent.
B.

Bohac Analysis

Next, the court rejected the Court of International Trade's
conclusion that the use of the word "before" in the Act was a drafting mistake.' 1 6 In overturning this ruling, the court considered Hogarth's contention that a court may change a word in a statute if the
use of a word is an "obvious mistake."'1 17 The court held that Bohac
did not apply because in Bohac the statute's text indicated a clear
mistake.118 Here, however, the Act's text was understandable with
the word "before," so the use of "before" was not a clear drafting
mistake. 1 9
C.

Garcia Analysis

The court then performed a Garcia analysis to determine if
Congress clearly intended to use the word "after."120 If congressional intent to use "after" was clear, then the court could construe
the Act "contrary to the plain meaning of its text.' 12' The court
noted a prior enactment, standing alone, did not indicate that later
changes were contrary to congressional intent. 22 Further, the
court asserted that the use of the word "after" in previous statutes
was not indicative of whether the use of the word "before" in the
114. Id. (recognizing that Interim-Final Rule directly conflicts with Act).
115. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1366 (noting that because Congress directly answered precise question at issue, analysis of Chevron's second prong was
unnecessary).
116. Id. at 1365-67 (recognizing that both Court of International Trade and
Hogarth relied on prior legislation, legislative history, practical considerations,
and International Agreement in determining that word "before" was drafting
mistake).
117. Id. at 1366-67 (addressing Hogarth's argument to change "before" in Act
to "after" based on Bohac's doctrine of mistake).
118. Id. at 1366 (noting that use of word "changes" in Bohac was obvious mistake because that statute dealt with what successful plaintiff could recover; it was
obvious that word used was supposed to be "damages").
119. Id. (explaining that doctrine of mistake usually involves drafting mistake
by someone unfamiliar with law (citing United States Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents
of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993))).
120. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1367 (setting out requirements of Garcia).
121. Id.; see also Garcia,469 U.S. at 75 ("[O]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions from [the legislative history] would justify a limitation
on the 'plain meaning' of the statutory language.").
122. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1367 (noting that Congress can change meaning of
statute so that it differs from previous statutes).
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Act was deliberate or a mistake.1 23 Moreover, the court pointed out
that the Supremacy Clause requires a statute to take precedent over
an executive agreement. 124 As a result, Congress could not have
intended the International Agreement to govern the Interim-Final
Rule. 125 Consequently, the court held that the Act "clearly require[d]" fishermen to complete backdown procedures one-half
126
hour before sunset.
D.

Chenery Analysis

Hogarth alternatively argued that the Secretary had congressional authority to alter the Act's provisions as long as the alterations conformed to the IDCP.' 27 Specifically, Hogarth contended
that 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (C) gave the Secretary the power to alter regulations dealing with "fishing practices," and that the permissible time period for backdown procedures was a "fishing
practice." 128 The court agreed with Hogarth and held that, pursuant to section 1413(a) (2) (C), the Secretary was allowed to change
the backdown procedure set forth in the Act. 129 Consequently, the
court held that the Secretary's decision to adopt the "after" sunset
130
standard was in accordance with the law.
Defenders, however, objected to the court's approach, arguing
that, under the Cheneiy doctrine, the alteration was improper because the Secretary did not rely on section 1413(a) (2)(C) when
promulgating the Interim-Final Rule.13 1 The court dismissed De123. Id. at 1366 (specifying that it cannot tell whether Congress use of
"before" was intentional or unintentional).
124. Id. at 1367 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2) (pointing out that International Agreement was executive agreement and Act was statute).
125. Id. (implying that Act, not International Agreement, governs InterimFinal Rule).
126. Id. (acknowledging that Act directly conflicts with Interim-Final Rule as
to backdown procedures).
127. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1367 (addressing Hogarth's second argument).
The IDCP was created by the International Agreement which required fishermen
to complete backdown procedures one-half hour after sunset. Id.
128. Id. (stating Act's requirements). The Act specifically says that "the Secretary may make such adjustments as may be appropriate to requirements of subpar-

agraph (B) that pertain to fishing gear, vessel equipment, and fishing practices to
the extent the adjustments are consistent with the International Dolphin Conservation Program." Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (C) (2000)).
129. Id. (noting that Secretary's change is consistent with IDCP).
130. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1367 (concluding that NMFS' alteration was authorized). The court recognized that Defenders did not challenge grant of authority in 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (C), so it did not consider that issue. Id.
131. Id. at 1368 (arguing that court cannot make up its own factual findings
to support Secretary's decision).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss2/6

16

v. Hogarth:SETS
Has the Sun Set on Saving the D
SUNDOWN
2004] Woodworth: Defenders of Wildlife

477

fenders' Chenery claim for two reasons. 1 32 First, the court found
that the NMFS supported its decision by relying on the fact that the
Interim-Final Rule was consistent with the International Agreement.1 33 Second, the court determined that it was not required to
make factual findings; instead, it was only required to decide
whether section 1413(a) (2) (C) gave the NMFS the authority to create the Interim-Final Rule.' 34 The court concluded that the NMFS
would still have changed "before" to "after" had it considered section 1413(a) (2) (C) because the NMFS already made the InterimFinal Rule consistent with the IDCP. 13 5 The Federal Circuit rejected Defenders' arguments and upheld the Court of International
Trade's decision that the Interim-Final Rule and the Act did not
136
conflict.
V.

A.

CRITIcAL ANALYSIS

Chevron

Both statutory language and case law support the Federal Circuit's holding that the Secretary erred in concluding that Congress
made a mistake in requiring backdown procedures to be completed
one-half hour before sunset. 13 7 Congress met the first prong of the
Chevron test because it spoke directly to the "precise question at issue" by using the word "before. ' 13 8 A court cannot disregard a stat132. Id. (noting that Chenery doctrine states that "[i]f the action rests upon an
administrative determination - an exercise ofjudgment in an area which Congress
has entrusted to the agency - of course it must not be set aside because the reviewing court might have made a different determination were it empowered to do
so.") (quoting Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94).
133. Id. (noting that International Agreement created IDCP).
134. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1368 (relying on Fleshman v. West, 138 F.3d 1429,
1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988), which states "the [Chenery] doctrine does not require a remand to the agency if it is clear that 'the agency would have reached the same
ultimate result' had it considered the new ground." (citations omitted)).
135. See id. (noting additionally that in response to comment to proposed
Interim-Final Rule, NMFS relied on Interim-Final Rule being consistent with International Agreement, MMPA Amendments, and La Jolla Agreement as supporting
its decision to require backdown procedures to be completed one-half hour after
sunset).
136. See id. (addressing additional holdings of lower court). The Federal Circuit also held that the Court of International Trade did not err in concluding that
the NMFS' decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement was not
arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 1374. That holding will not be discussed in this
Note.
137. See id. at 1374-75 (noting that issue was promulgation of Interim-Final
Rule which directly contradicted Act authorizing Interim-Final Rule).
138. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (recognizing that when court reviews construction of statute, first step in analysis asks whether Congress has spoken direwtly to
question at issue).
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ute's comprehendible meaning, and the Act's use of the word
"before" gave the statute a comprehendible meaning.' 3 9 Consequently, Congress' intent in using "before" is clear; therefore, that
is "the end of the matter," and the court must give effect to the
140
plain language of the statute.
B.

Bohac

Additionally, the court properly rejected the applicability of
Bohac.14 1 In Bohac, the mistaken word made the statute incomprehensible. 14 2 Here, the word "before" does not make the statute in143
comprehensible; as a result, Bohac is inapplicable.
C.

Garcia

The court's Garcia analysis, however, was unnecessary because
the contradictions regarding backdown procedures in the legislative history did not make this a "rare and exceptional circumstance." 144 In Garcia,the court continued its analysis by examining
the legislative history. In Connecticut National Bank, however, the
court stated that legislative history should not be considered if the
statute is unambiguous. 145 According to the precedent set in Chevron and Connecticut NationalBank, the court's consideration of legislative history was inconsistent with case law because, unlike Garcia,
46
this case did not involve "rare and exceptional circumstances."
Regardless of the Garcia analysis, the court properly determined
139. Id. at 842-43 (holding that court must give effect to "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
140. See id. (noting that if intent of Congress is clear, court need not consider
second prong which questions whether agency's interpretation is permissible construction of statute). Additionally, "[an] agency may not ignore Congress."
Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
141. See Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1375 (Newman,J., dissenting) (noting Hogarth
argued that because Congress made mistake, Secretary was not required to follow
statute).
142. See Bohac v. Department of Agriculture,239 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(noting appellate court can interpret statute to correct obvious mistake).
143. See Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1366 (pointing out doctrine of mistake applies
to cases where mistake is clear from text of statute).
144. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (quoting TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978); Crooks v. Harrelson,282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)) (explaining that when court finds statute to be unambiguous, court's inquiry is complete
except in "rare and exceptional circumstances.").
145. See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (holding that
court should presume that legislature means what it says).
146. See Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60 ("[Tiojustify a departure from the letter of the
law ... the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral or common
sense.").
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that the Secretary could not ignore the word "before" when
147
promulgating the Interim-Final Rule.
D.

Chenery

The court's holding allowing the Interim-Final Rule to stand is
inconsistent with precedent. 148 The court should have only conducted a Chevron analysis. 149 The court determined that Congress
unambiguously expressed its intent as to the timing of backdown
procedures. 150 Accordingly, it could not construe the statute contrary to the plain meaning of the text.15 1 Thus, the court should
have concluded that the Interim-Final Rule could not contradict
5 2
the Act because of the statute's unambiguous language.
Instead, the court decided that the Secretary could alter the
statute because 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (C) allowed the Secretary to
adjust "fishing practices" as long as these adjustments were consistent with the IDCP.1 53 The court's analysis conflicts with both statutory analysis and case law because the Secretary did not rely on
section 1413(a)(2)(C) when promulgating the Interim-Final
Rule. 15 4 According to Chenery, an administrative order cannot be
sustained unless the grounds the court used to sustain the action
were the same grounds upon which the agency relied. 155 Here, the
Secretary did not rely on section 1413 (a) (2) (C) to promulgate the
Interim-Final Rule. 156 Consequently, under Chenery, the court can147. Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1366-67 (noting that Act clearly required one-half
hour before sunset time limit).
148. See id. at 1375 (Newman,J., dissenting) (arguing court's holding is violation of administrative and statutory law).
149. See id. at 1374-75 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that after court correctly concluded that Secretary erred, court then affirmed Secretary's action on
alternative grounds).
150. See id. at 1367 (recognizing that Act clearly required fishermen to complete backdown procedure one-half hour before sunset).
151. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (holding that if congressional intent is
unambiguous, court must give effect to that intent).
152. See Conn. Nat. Bank, 503 U.S. at 254 (holding that once court determines
statute uses unambiguous terms, court's inquiry is complete).
153. See Defenders 330 F.3d at 1375 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting court
held sua sponte that 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (C) allowed Secretary to change timing
of backdown procedures).
154. See Taking of Marine Mammals, supra note 34, at *39 (indicating Secretary
relied on theory that provision in Act requiring backdown procedures to be completed one-half hour before sunset was drafting error).
155. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1942). "[A]n administrative order
cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising
its power were those upon which its action can be sustained." Id.
156. See id. at 94 (holding it is not for court to independently determine what
agency did not determine).
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not utilize section 1413(a) (2) (C) to uphold the Secretary's alteration and allow the Interim-Final Rule to contradict the Act.1 57
In addition, the court's denial of Defenders' Chenery claim was
flawed for three reasons.' 58 First, the Secretary believed that the
use of the word "before" in the Act was a drafting error and relied
on the IDCP to support his use of the word "after" in the InterimFinal Rule.' 5 9 The court, however, held that Congress did not
make a drafting mistake in the Act, so the court could not examine
the Secretary's reasoning for promulgating the Interim-Final
Rule. 160 Therefore, the ground upon which the Secretary acted in
promulgating the Interim-Final Rule (that Congress made a mistake in using the word "before") is not one upon which the Secretary's action can be sustained.' 6 '
Second, the court relied on Fleshman to distinguish Chenery because in both Fleshman and the present case the court was not required to make additional factual findings like the court in
Cheney.162 Although the court here was not required to make additional factual findings, it did make a decision which Congress
placed solely within the Secretary's discretion. 63 In particular, the
court made a decision regarding the definition of "fishing prac157. See id. at 95 (holding that administrative action can only be measured by
what agency did, not by what agency might have done).
158. See Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1376 (Newman, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
that court recognized it could not affirm agency action unless agency relied on
those grounds).
159. See Taking of MarineMammals, supra note 34, at *39 (noting additionally
that previous amendments to MMPA, LaJolla Agreement, and IDCP all used word
"after").
160. See Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1376 (Newman, J., dissenting) (pointing out
Secretary was only allowed to make adjustments that were appropriate, therefore
"[s]ince the court agrees that 'before sundown' was not a mistake, it cannot be
'appropriate' or an 'adjustment' to change it.").
161. See Taking of Marine Mammals, supranote 34, at *39 (noting that Secretary
should seek to amend statute).
162. See Fleshman v. West, 138 F.3d 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "[T]he doctrine does not prohibit a reviewing court from affirming an agency decision on a
ground different from the one used by the agency if the new ground is not one
that calls for 'a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is
authorized to make.'" Id. (quoting Kayo Seiko Co. v. United States, 95 F.3d 1094,
1101 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
163. See 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (C) (2000) (allowing Secretary to make appropriate adjustments to subparagraph (B), which included permissible time for
backdown procedures, that pertain to fishing practices); see also SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1946) (noting that when court is dealing with judgment
which Congress has entrusted solely to administrative agency, court cannot affirm
inadequate or improper grounds by substituting its own judgment because "[t] o
do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.").
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rices" under section 1413 (a)(2)(C).164 The court held that the

timing of backdown procedures was a "fishing practice" under section 1413 (a)(2) (C).

16 5

By doing so, the court entered into the do-

main that Congress had entrusted to the Secretary; therefore, the
166
court violated the Chenery doctrine.
Third, as in Fleshman, the court held that if the Secretary had
considered section 1413 (a) (2) (C), he or she would have reached
the same conclusion as the court. 167 Fleshman, however, is distinguishable from the present case because the facts here do not indicate that the Secretary "exercised [his or her] discretion" in
determining what constitutes a "fishing practice."' 168 As a consequence of the Secretary's failure to define "fishing practices," the
court could not determine that. the Secretary would have reached
the same conclusion had he or she considered whether backdown
procedures were "fishing practices. ' 169 Accordingly, the court's
conclusion that section 1413(a) (2) (C) permitted the Secretary to
use the word "after" in the Interim-Final Rule is contrary to existing
170
case law.

In summary, the court's decision that the Secretary could not
ignore the word "before," when promulgating the Interim-Final
17 1
Rule, is consistent with both statutory analysis and case law.
Nonetheless, the court's conclusion that the Secretary had the authority under section 1413(a) (2) (C) to change the word "before" is
172
inconsistent with statutory and case law.

164. See Defenders 330 F.3d at 1367 (noting that § 1413(a) (2) (C) authorized
Secretary to draft Interim-Final Rule in accordance with IDCP).
165. Id. (noting that "[t]he period for permissible sundown sets is a fishing
practice subject to section 1413(a)(2)(C).").
166. See Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94-95 (noting that by not allowing court to substitute its own judgment, agency is free to exercise its administrative discretion).
167. See Fleshman, 138 F.3d at 1433 (noting that "the [Chenery] doctrine does
not require a remand to the agency if it is clear that 'the agency would have
reached the same ultimate result' had it considered the new ground.") (quoting
Ward v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 981 F.2d 521, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
168. See id. (noting that Board's underlying findings show that Board had already "exercised its discretion" in determining alternative ground upon which
court relied).
169. See generally Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94-95 (noting that court should not enter
province which belongs to agency).
170. See Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1376 (Newman,J., dissenting) (noting that Congress only gave Secretary authority to adjust, but not significantly alter, provisions
of 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2) (B)).
171. See generally id. at 1365-68 (setting out court's decision).
172. See generally id. (setting out court's decision).
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IMPACT

"Sundown sets" occur when the backdown procedure is completed after the sun sets. 173 Although technology has increased the
successfulness of backdown procedures, they are still complicated
procedures and "sundown sets" add to that complexity.' 7 4 "Sundown sets" result in higher dolphin mortality rates than sets completed during daylight for two reasons. 175 First, fishermen have
reduced visibility at night.176 Second, many dolphins rely on visual
sensitivity; as a result, they tend to become more confused and agitated at night.17 7 Studies indicate that up to four times as many
dolphins die during "sundown sets" as compared to sets performed
in daylight.' 7 8 Consequently, the Federal Circuit's holding that
fishermen do not have to perform backdown procedures until onehalf hour after sunset has the potential to increase dolphin mortal79

ity rates. 1

Additionally, one of the Act's original goals was to reduce
dolphin mortality rates. 180 Therefore, the court's holding, that the
Secretary could change Congress' mandate that backdown procedures be completed one-half hour before sunset, hinders congres173. See DoLPHINS AND THE TUNA INDUsTRY 61 (National Academy of Science
ed., 1992), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309047358/html/61.html#
pagetop (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (noting that sets completed after dark are also
referred to as "night sets").
174. See Parker, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that for fishermen to complete
successful backdown procedure, they need to avoid high-risk situations such as
sundown sets).
175. See generally SOUTHWEST FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER, The Tuna-Dolphin Is-

sue, at http://swfsc.nmfs.noaa.gov/PRDTemp/PROGRAMS/DolphinStock/tdissue.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (listing reasons why dolphins might be killed
during sets).
176. See Russell, supra note 1 (recognizing that human error contributes to
problems during sundown sets).
177. See DOLPHINS AND THE TUNA INDUSTRY, supra note 173 at 62 (recognizing
that darkness presents problems for dolphins' perception of situation because reduction in light underneath water as sun sets is much greater than reduction of
light above water).
178. See Kenneth Brower, The Destructionof Dolphins, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
July 1989, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/89jul/dolph3.htm (noting that NMFS provision prohibiting "sundown sets" was dropped after being in
effect for just eight days because of pressure from industry lobbyists); see also DoLPHINS AND THE TUNA INDUSTRY, supra note 173, at 62 (indicating that in a study,
sundown sets which made up only 9.3% of 16,000 sets observed, accounted for
26% of dolphin deaths).
179. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, 330 F.3d 1358, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(noting that backdown procedures are not perfect and frequently kill dolphins).
180. See 16 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (2000) (indicating that Congress seeks to "progressively reduce dolphin mortality to a level approaching zero ....");see also
Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1375 (noting that statute was created to reduce dolphin mortality caused by purse seining).
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sional intent.18 Although the time difference between one-half
hour before sundown and one-half hour after sundown might seem
insignificant, congressional intent to reduce the dolphin mortality
rate combined with the after sundown requirement's potential to
increase the dolphin mortality rate, makes the difference extremely
1 82
significant.
Ashley Woodworth
181. See Defenders, 330 F.3d at 1376 (noting that time limit less favorable to
dolphins is contained in IDCP, but this does not allow NMFS to override Congress'
mandate in Act).
182. See generally id. at 1375-76 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting reasons why
court cannot ignore congressional intent); DOLPHINS AND THE TUNA INDUSTRY,
supra note 173, at 62 (pointing out how "sundown sets" can increase dolphin mortality rates).
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